Numerous scholars have commented on the judicial style of the Court of Justice of the European Union and its non-
FERNANDA G. NICOLA*

National Legal Traditions at Work in the Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Uniont
Numerous scholars have commented on the judicial style of the Court of Justice of the European Union and its non-Herculean judges, generally disapproving of its minimalist reasoning, lack of transparency, and failure to draw openly on comparative legal sources to avoid inconsistencies and weaknesses in its legal reasoning. In a debate where both historians and sociologists have provided new avenues of research, the paucity of comparative lawyers is surprising because European law is a quintessential example of a transnational legal order. Since its inception, European judges, advocates general, and lawyers in Luxembourg have drawn inspiration from the different national legal traditions of the member states through a comparative exegesis of legal rules. In departing from a comparative exegesis or a legal origins approach, this Article shows how the Court's decisions often manifest influence from multiple legal systems, suggesting that judges, advocates general, and lawyers are influenced by-and have reconciled the contradictions among-national legal traditions and judicial styles that acquire different meanings in the European context. Resorting to national traditions might be a valuable legal strategy for judges and advocates general seeking to advance new legal concepts, incorporate new procedures, or reject changes to EU law. Even though there are inconsistencies and weaknesses in the Court's jurisprudence, by comparing national legal traditions "at work," they can be explained as the residue of different legal styles that have come into conflict or tension over time.
Several narratives from across the Atlantic facilitate a better understanding of the Court's legal reasoning, often providing insight on an international court which began distancing itself from traditional international courts early on. In the Stein-Weiler narrative, the Court was no longer an international tribunal, but rather a constitutional actor at the center of European legal evolution.
1 2 Another group, led by political scientists such as Mattili, Slaughter," 3 Alter, 14 Moravcsik, and Conant, 1 5 recast the narrative as a battle between liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism to make sense of the judicial revolution spurred by the Court and its interlocutors. More recently, a growing number of European sociologists have eschewed both approaches in favor of a map of the legal elites and tools that contributed to the formation of the European legal profession.
1 6 Others have revamped EU legal history by showing how everyday European practices and leading figures of Europe's past have important implications for Europe's future. 1 European legal historians have shed light on a constitutional culture that is less of a unitary and coherent legal practice and more of a fragmented, contested one that has to be understood as a continuous exchange and struggle between Luxembourg, Brussels, the member states' courts and parliaments, and public opinion within the member states. 18 With few exceptions, 1 9 comparative lawyers have contributed in a limited way to these debates surrounding the CJEU, even 12 
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Law, 21 CONTEMP. EuR. HIsT 24 and political ideology traveling across different legal regimes. Since the beginning, judges who studied under different legal regimes (civil or common law inside or outside of Europe) have come together in Luxembourg and compared national legal traditions, 25 rather than interpret international law norms, as part of their cognitive apparatus.
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The reasons are numerous and this topic, alone, could become a field of inquiry. On the EU law side, the strict compartmentalization of European lawyers, who are often segregated into public or private practices in legal academia, 27 means they have developed an obsession with case law in their circumscribed enclaves of EU law (administrative, criminal, constitutional, business) without systematically exploring judicial styles and nonlegal influences on EU law. 28 On the comparative law side, especially to scholars who are not located in Europe, EU law is no longer the epicenter of the geographical interest of comparative lawyers who expanded their research beyond the West, tracing the patterns of European colonialism.
2 9 Besides expanding their spatial reach, comparative lawyers have long departed from exploring the law as presented on the books, instead choosing to focus on the informal social norms that characterize legal regimes. EU law lost some of its appeal to comparative lawyers-especially those European legal historians who feel under pressure due to the growing relevance of global histories 
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consequence, the comparative method as a tool for understanding the legal reasoning of the CJEU's jurisprudence is no longer informing current debates.
1
My contribution to this Symposium urges a greater involvement for comparative law scholars in the current literature on the debates surrounding CJEU jurisprudence, its raison d'dtre, its cryptic style, and the expanded realm of its jurisdiction.
3 2 By using a comparative law lens, scholars can shed light on how, at a time of crisis for Europe, the Court and its comparative legal reasoning remained a relatively stable institution in providing continuity to legal integration-despite EU law's fluctuating acceptance and resistance by the member states, 3 3 national courtS, 34 and civil society. 35 The absence of a comparative law method in EU law led scholars to rely on a theory of legal origins, 3 6 based on an economic account of legal systems which is widely criticized among comparative lawyers. 7 Instead of a historical development, which traces national legal traditions back to their societal and cultural beginnings, the legal origins literature 3 8 has created deep biases in contemporary analyses by drawing correlations between legal traditions taken out of context and economic outcomes.
3 9 For instance, the idea that judges are more independent in common law jurisdictions (thus 
I. EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE BEYOND CIVIL AND COMMON LAW
A. Judicial Styles
The Court of Justice is tasked with the interpretation and application of the European treaties and follows the procedures outlined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 46 Because the Court consists of one judge per member state, its initial group of six judges has grown to twenty-eight today as a result of the various enlargements of the EU. This number does not include the eleven advocates general, who assist the Court by providing independent opinions, nor the judges of the General Court, which is currently in the process of doubling its numbers in order to keep up with its enormous docket and create more specialized judges. The reform is also a method for achieving greater gender parity at the Court as a whole, given the current imbalance among its members.
In the 1960s, the judicial style of the Court was clearly embedded in the civil law tradition, as its German, French, Italian, and Benelux judges' Romano-Germanic traditions dominated. This is no longer the case, however, as the accession of the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries, and the former socialist countries in central Europe brought significant new styles to which this Article will not do full justice. In particular, several authors have highlighted how a court modeled initially on the French Conseil d'Atat has shifted to using common law reasoning such as stare decisis and a more publicly argumentative style.
7
The effect of a common law perspective might affect judges' perception of EU law, such as the Court's commitment to rely primarily on the treaties or EU legislation rather than on precedent; similarly, it could affect the language of the Court's judgments, which can be obscure and cryptic and do not include dissenting or concurring opinions as common law traditions do, without which it is harder for commentators to assess any alternative interpretations. The CJEU's blurred legal reasoning might be explained by its style and practices, as opposed to a conscious obscurantism on the part of its judges. Thus the highly praised, though controversial, secrecy of judicial deliberations might be the result of a civil law inclination toward "terseness"48 and the ex ante approach to deliberation; 49 it could also be the result of a careful institutional design decision to give judges limited terms in office, countering the lifetime appointments typical of common law jurisdictions. Since Weiler and De Bilrca's volume appraising the Court's new judicial architecture apr~s Nice, 5 1 the amount of scholarly work focused on the CJEU has increased exponentially. If the Court was not previously the sustained center of attention in European Union legal studies, this has clearly shifted by now. 52 Recent emphasis has been placed on the selection of judges going to Luxembourg and on procedures to create an efficient and consistent European jurisprudence-such as the inclusion of twenty-four languages in the bureaucracy and the employment of electronic tools that have reduced reliance on paper documents.
Finally, all eyes are on the Court with the imminent doubling of the General Court to fifty-six judges and the abolition of the Civil Service Tribunal.
5 3 In 2009, a working group was established to address the fact that judges on the General Court were subject to an increased docket that created procedural delays amounting to five years to decide a routine competition law case, for example. Yet the reform has been criticized by several member states, academics, 5 4 and even four judges on the General Court who opposed the reform without, however, agreeing on a feasible alternative to it.6 5 The reform incorporates the judges of the Civil Service Tribunal into the General Court which, by 2019, will be composed of two judges from each Member State for a total of fiftysix judges, anticipating a manageable caseload of thirty-one cases a year, equivalent to that of the Court of Justice.
Another concern expressed by critics is the lack of transparency of the Court's files, and a desire for the public to have greater and easier access to these documents. 5 1 In December 2015, the Court of Justice officially opened its archives to the public, a move that was celebrated as the result of concerted efforts to overcome fears regarding the loss of confidentiality in a Court that had been thoroughly committed to maintaining the secrecy of its deliberations from the very start. 5 
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transparency-or, as President Lenaerts puts it, between "the proper functioning of the judicial proceedings and openness"-the pendulum has shifted towards increasing openness and better understanding of the CJEU. 6 In the civil law tradition, judges, at least at the declaratory level, are mere interpreters of a piece of legislation or codes, writing in a style that is succinct and short, but otherwise they have more discretion than their common law counterparts. Another classic explanation of the civil law style of judicial interpretation is the distinction between doctrinal and authentic interpretation of law. Whereas the latter is a positivist interpretation, the doctrinal interpretation draws on scholarly work and can be traced back to Roman law, when the opinions of legal scholars or jurisconsults were vital to the process and became valuable precedent. These opinions also played a central role in a revival of the abstract meaning of legal concepts in the jus commune in Europe, thanks to the role of jurists who opposed the jus proprium as characterized by the variety of local laws.
5 9 By turning away from scholarly commentaries, judges focused their attention on the Corpus Juris Civilis and the authority of the Emperor-similar to the shift a few centuries later in 1804 with the Code Napoldon. In both cases, as Merryman points out, "the number and diversity of doctrinal points of view and the mass and varying quality of doctrinal writing were described as evils to be corrected by compilation and codification." 6 0
While civil law courts rely on the secrecy of their decision-making process to maintain authority, common law courts struggle with their legitimacy and must justify their policy choices to the bar, the bench, and the world. 
B. Critiques and Responses
There is a common lament regarding the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice that, despite its increasing prominence and relevance in Europe and around the globe, it receives relatively little scholarly attention, and the number of students interested in EU law is declining, especially in the United States.
62 A classic explanation is that European legal reasoning tends to be positivist and dogmatic, and formalist. 6 5 Other explanations criticize the lack of transparency in the Court's decisions and style, and accuse it of promoting vague judicial reasoning by refusing either to include dissenting and concurring opinions 66 or to explain the foreign or comparative legal sources on which it relies. 67 Finally, others have shed light on the more fundamental problem of EU law scholarship not engaging critically with the Court, due in part to the tendency of such scholarship to disregard "other" legal disciplines, including comparative law, critical legal theory, and postcolonial studies. 68 This Article sheds light on how national legal traditions have contributed to the style and creation of different sites of authority and resistance to EU law, due to its unique mutual dependence on national and trasnational legal orders. 69 
II. NATIONAL LEGAL TRADITIONS IN EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE
The study of legal traditions in the twenty-first century is often relegated to the field of legal historians 7 0 or to the job of revamping non-Western legal traditions." Yet, some of the major differences in judicial interpretation still matter today, and as a famous legal historian stated, 
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NATIONAL LEGAL TRADITIONS the age-old English instinct is to say, with Lord Denning, 'trust the judges, for they are the true guardians of the law'. The German feeling, which also goes back several centuries, is to say, with Savigny, 'trust the learned jurists, for they are the best guides through the thickets of the law'. The French instinct, on the other hand, is to say, in true Jacobin and Napoleonic vein, 'trust the legislator and beware of judges and jurists who pervert the codes'. As none of these traditions is the sole road to salvation, a truly European law ought to contain the most helpful elements of each one of them.
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This challenge was also obvious to the eleven "Founding Fathers of Europe." It was clear that a court tasked with promoting and upholding justice in the new melting pot of traditions of the European Community would have to be able to reconcile its different legal traditions and, more importantly, build on the cross-influence and dialogue of the Romano-Germanic system. 7 3 In 1957, one of the early cases before the Court of Justice, Algera, 74 presented a problem that the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community did not account for regarding the repeal of an earlier, illegal decision. This is a common problem in administrative law, entailing either the nullity or revocability of the measure at stake. Here, the Court had to resort to consulting the national legal traditions and the Opinion of Advocate General Lagrange to find a solution. Ultimately, "the Court adopted, without much further ado, the solution adopted in French administrative law." 75 More than ten years later, another well-known example is Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 76 in which the Court reaffirmed its doctrine of supremacy while simultaneously holding that fundamental rights were "an integral part of the general principles" of European law, as supported by the opinion of Advocate General Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, stating that, "whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the member states, [they] must be ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the Community." 9 Since the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht in 199380 and later in Article 4(2) TEU in the Treaty of Lisbon, 81 the constitutionalization of this principle clearly states that the EU must respect the national identities of the member states, so that CJEU judges will interpret this provision by balancing derogations from national laws in favor of EU law through proportionality analyses.82
A. The French Tradition
France was one of the Founding Members and six signatories of the Treaties of Paris and Rome, and it historically influenced the legal systems of Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy. Two important characteristics have been traced back to the French legal tradition: (1) the reduction of judges to bureaucrats, especially after the adoption of the Code Napoldon, which represents the supremacy of the legislature over the judiciary, and (2) the prestige of French administrative law, with the Conseil d'Etat as the highest administrative branch that remained indifferent to Europeanization until 2007.83 Both are important descriptive factors, but still tell us very little about the influence of the French legal tradition on the legal reasoning of the CJEU. Mitchel Lasser tells part of this story by identifying a pattern of hostility in the reception of the European legal system by French judges, lawyers, and jurists through the ascendance of fundamental rights jurisprudence that connected both systems and changed domestic social norms. 84 The reverse story, however, which is aimed at tracing how French legal ideas, personalities, and culture deeply influenced European jurisprudence, has been studied less by comparative lawyers than by historians. 8 5 French, as the working language of the Court, has become a central feature of Luxembourg because all cases before the Court must be translated into this language, a time-consuming process. 8 Here, the Court used French legal tradition to construe free-movement-of-goods jurisprudence, even before launching on the Single Market project.
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Instead of detecting the legal origins of this judgment, 93 EU legal scholars lament that Cassis de Dijon follows "non-revolutionary" jurisprudence, 9 4 meaning that the entire internal market jurisprudence of the CJEU had to draw lines between the application of the four freedoms and the autonomy of member states' protective regulations, which is based on "open-ended concepts" and the "absence of The term was absent in the initial text of the Treaty provisions, but these provisions, though only referring to tariffs, quantitative restrictions, measures of equivalent effect etc., amount to establishing free movement of goods within the Community. The Cassis de Dijon line of case law is entirely based on this general principle. 97 In Cassis de Dijon, discriminatory national provisions that favor domestic traders over importers were held not to be an obstacle to free movement when they can be justified as necessary to satisfy "mandatory requirements," an unfortunate translation from the French expression exigences impiratives. This proportionality test -has encouraged the Court, as Kalypso Nicolaidis has colorfully expressed it, to step back from the recognition abyss even in the beverage and foods department, as with cheese additives (Nisin) banned by the Dutch. No matter that most Europeans, indeed most human beings, while they delight in very different tastes, find the same poisons poisonous. Even then, different publics, consumers, societies might accept different levels of risk. And when the Court did strike with a duty of recognition-it did often enough to ensure the free movement of beer, butter, oil and pasta-not everyone was happy. "Ah, I cannot recognize as pasta anything which comes so gluey 
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NATIONAL LEGAL TRADITIONS out of the pot," a well-loved Italian ECJ judge confided in me the other day. 99 The story behind Cassis de Dijon is one of, as Nicolaidis puts it, "managed" mutual recognition that departs from some of the founding myths of European integration as driven by a neoliberal conspiracy at the supranational level. 100 In essence, the Luxembourg judges were aware that the Cassis de Dijon doctrine had wider implications than freedom of commerce, but in light of the German and American federal experiences, they knew they were establishing a market test with longstanding implications for private and public law. 101 The Germans worried about the implications of this judgment regarding the competence of the Court to regulate interstate commerce, and thus the German government put pressure on the Commission to come up with a plan.
10 2 Unsurprisingly, Cassis de Dijon originated from a preliminary question of the Hesse Financial Court questioning the compatibility of German law with Article 34 TFEU on the prohibition of measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on trade.
The introduction of proportionality at the end of the Cassis de Dijon doctrine-to reconcile opposing views such as individualism versus community, authority versus liberty, welfarism versus neoliberalism, and European versus member state competence-was the outcome of a compromise reviving balancing tests among European jurists who had long shared a common faith in this form of legal reasoning.
B. Towards a Romano-Germanic Model: The German Tradition
The German tradition has been invoked in EU law either in a simplistic way to say that CJEU judges have more discretion than French ones 103 or in a sophisticated way to show how the attitude of German judges is less rule-conscious and more interested in the "dialectical relationship between the facts and the law" than is the case in France.
1 04 Unsurprisingly, the jurisprudence of the CJEU has become more attentive to the facts of each case and its judgments have become less abstract. This attitude can be traced back to the German Historical School under the legacy of Friedrich Carl von Savigny, who revamped the Roman law tradition in Germany 10 5 The Historical School positioned itself against the Acole de l'Exdghse, which supported French jurists' strict adherence to the texts of the codes. 10 6 However, comparative lawyers have demonstrated how Savigny's legacy in legal reasoning goes beyond the German-French divide, 107 and there are at least two noteworthy features in the evolution of a European jurisprudence.
The first is that Savigny's Historical School had a very strong legal and social connotation through the notion of a Volksgeist as the common consciousness of the people. 108 Therefore, in EU law the notion of "community" is often associated with the Germanic tradition, leading to notions such as greater freedom for judges and the primacy of social interests as opposed to individual ones. 109 A second feature of Savigny's legacy was the incorporation of Roman lawo 1 0 into his reconstruction of a classical legal thought based on abuse of deduction and individual rights, expressed through private property and freedom of contract.' This formalist strand of nineteenth-century legal thought had followers in both France and Germany until the rejection of classical legal thought and its legal deductive reasoning in the early twentieth century. Rudolf von Jhering's critique of individual sovereignty brought into question the coherence of legal reasoning, arguing that sovereignty was not a matter of deductive interpretation but' was instead rooted in mechanical social causes that were motivated by human ends. 112 French jurists such as Francois G6ny, Eduard Lambert, and Louis Josserand developed, as a reaction to the formalist thinking of the classical era, some canons of sociological jurisprudence.
1 13 Both Jhering and G6ny criticized dogmatic interpretation and advocated in favor of balance and proportionality without fully developing the implications of this central legal theory which were further developed by American jurists such as Oliver Wendell Holmes.1 14 Both features fed the Romano-Germanic tradition and were central to reconciling the differences existing between the French and German legal traditions, from which similarities could also be distilled as derived from a revamped Roman legal order. 115 To the European founders, those jurists able to navigate both traditions-having reconciled differences and similarities in the best comparative legal tradition 1 6 through their exposure to both French and German legal education-were better suited to become the judges and advocates general of a court with a European sensibility." 7 The work of legal historians has shed light on the biographies of judges and advocates general, as well as on Michel Gaudet, the Commission's Legal Service director and a central figure in the creation of the direct effect doctrine in Van Gend en Loos."' Among the stellar recipients of the Romano-Germanic tradition were jurists educated in both systems such as Maurice Lagrange, the spiritual father of Michel Gaudet; Pierre Pescatore, the Luxembourg judge;I 9 and the Italian private law professor Alberto Trabucchi.1 2 0 After distancing himself from the racist Vichy regime where he worked on the adoption of laws excluding Jews from the civil service, Lagrange served in 1949 in a mission to "democratize" the German public service with American authorities in Berlin. 122 Lagrange paved the way for the "judicialization" of the Court and, by departing from mere textualism or a diplomatic approach to international law, he was behind some of the most important constitutional decisions of the Court. 123 He contributed to the "silent revolution" by promoting a teleological federalism for "a federal Court that will have no need to borrow its judicial system from overseas, but will quite naturally find its original foundations in the best of the legal experience of its own members." 124 Well known for his famous opinions in cases such as Costa v. Enel (which established the primacy of EU law), the federalist Lagrange relied on the comparative legal method as early as 1955 when, as advocate general of the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community, he stated that "[a]s regards the sources of that law, there is obviously nothing to prevent them being sought, where appropriate, in international law, but normally, and in most cases, they will be found rather in the internal law of the various Member States." 1 25 Later on, Lagrange embraced what he called a "global" method of interpretation for the Court, which, since its very first judgment, had embraced, albeit tentatively, the notion that judges were driven by rules applied by national courts rather than the "usual vagaries" of the international courts. 126 Beyond the principle of proportionality in the famous Cassis formula, the Court drew inspiration from common principles of legality developed by the member states in their administrative law practice.12 7 As Koopmans relates, the prominent German notion of Verhdltnisma/3igkeit, "a British member of the Court once explained to English judges, [means] that you do not crack a nut with a sledgehammer." 12 8 The principle of proportionality was further developed in famous cases involving beer purity and Italian vinegar, in which freedom of movement prevailed over domestic restrictions -deemed too zealous in their protection of German and Italian consumers.129 In doing so, the common faith in balancing as derived from the German and French legal traditions was revamped by European judges through the comparative method. 130 At the time, balancing appeared to be a lifesaver to the federalists, who knew that the most pressing legal challenge for the European Community was how to reconcile different legal traditions that, unlike the thirteen U.S. colonies, did not share a common legal system.
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C. Looking Across the Atlantic: The US. Legal Tradition in European Jurisprudence
In a post-war Europe undergoing legal reconstruction, judges were looking across the Atlantic while U.S. jurists and diplomats were interested in influencing the development of the newly established European jurisprudence. For example, the American scholar Eric Stein, 132 a proponent of the constitutional narrative of EU law, was also a close friend of Michel Gaudet and an habitud at the Commission, with an office in the Legal Service building in Brussels in which he spent his research semester. 133 According to Brigitte Leucht, the scholarly attention paid to the evolution of the U.S. 138 which was decided nine years before Cassis. Identifying functional differences and similarities, Maduro shows that the higher scrutiny applied to national measures in Cassis through proportionality is different from the U.S. Supreme Court's inclination to strike down protectionist measures in its context of a market from which there is no "exit" and in which both Congress and federal agencies provide further means of integration.
A legal explanation of the U.S. Supreme Court's subsequent departure from the Pike test can be found in the loss of faith in proportionality after the 1980s with the ascendance of the Rehnquist court, 139 followed by a more conceptual and neoformalist understanding of rights coupled with the rise of legal economics.
14 0 A similar skepticism emerged in European jurisprudence only a few decades later when, right before the financial crisis of 2007, the balancing of fundamental rights with economic freedoms by the European Court of Justice revealed that proportionality was not always able to tame the privatization and liberalization of services in the European market.
14 1
Even though more work is needed, the literature tracing the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court on the legal reasoning of the CJEU is expanding. At times, the advocates general's opinions reveal this openly, through citations to their U.S. counterparts; 142 at other times, scholars have traced the direct or indirect impact of U.S. jurisprudence as either a model or counter-model in the work of judges, lawyers, and jurists contributing to the migration of legal ideas across the Atlantic.14 III. NATIONAL LEGAL TRADITIONS "AT WORK" IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CJEU While important studies have taken the Europeanization of domestic law into consideration by creating change, irritation, or resistance in the legal systems of the member states, 1 4 this Article addresses the opposite phenomenon-namely, how the evolution of EU law can be traced back to national legal traditions that acquire different meanings and create tensions and inconsistencies at particular historical moments.
The national legal traditions at work, just like the "ontological identities" in European adjudication, as Judge Rodin calls them, provide a lens through which to examine how judges exercise their freedom and constraint in adjudication.
14 However, to do so, we must understand national legal traditions beyond the "existential angst" of the legal origins literature.
14 6 Comparative lawyers can compartmentalize legal traditions by describing them as linear and static, or instead show how they "work" by shaping and blending EU law or departing from European jurisprudence. The traditions I sketched above are only an initial sample intended to urge comparative lawyers to further trace the contributions of judges or advocates general from former socialist countries and draw more sophisticated distinctions among judges in continental legal traditions.
A. The Strategic Use of Legal Traditions
With the accession of Denmark and the United Kingdom in 1973, followed in 1995 by Sweden and Finland, the predominant influence of the civil law traditions on the Court came to an end and the common law and Scandinavian traditions began to play a role. Judges in England, in the absence of comprehensive legislation, make the law while constrained by their own precedents and are keen to look at facts to induce their legal reasoning.
1 47 When looking at law in action, however, comparativists have shown that civil law codes contain gaps and ambiguities. For instance, French judges have filled these gaps and substantively contributed to the evolution of tort law in a way that creates more similarities with their common law counterparts.
14 8 In contrast, the common law is more formulaic and, with its writs, creates procedural constraints through which to collect evidence and present legal claims or legal defenses that serve to protect individual rights, especially through judicial review of legislation. 149 The influence of the common law began showing its effects in the CJEU's more careful analysis of its own precedents, which by the 1980s were also of greater number. 1 5 0 In asserting the influence of precedent in famous cases such as "Buy Irish"1 5 1 and through expressions such as "as the Court repeatedly held,"1 5 2 the use of the common law tradition was also a strategy to assert the legitimacy and coherence of the Court's jurisprudence, showing to a newcomer (the Republic of Ireland in that case) that even advertising measures promoted by a private body could fall under the restrictions of the Dormant Commerce Clause, namely Article 34 TFEU.
Under the influence of the common law tradition and its adversarial character,1 53 the Court strengthened its oral procedure, allowing judges to entertain possible hearings of submissions from interested parties and, if appropriate, from the advocate general.1 54 In exceptional cases, the Court can even reopen a case for oral arguments if it has a sense that a decision cannot be made without a full discussion of the issues at stake.' 55 Such oral hearings have not always been a pleasant experience for civil law judges and lawyers in Luxembourg; at times, they have lengthened the procedure or augmented confusion, instead of providing clarity to the case.1 5 6 However, they have shaped the legal culture in a way that has enabled the Court to strengthen its dialogue with the bar and to require that lawyers be prepared to engage judges in discussion. By the late 1980s, the idea of a moot court to raise student awareness of EU law and to prepare future generations of lawyers for oral argument was fully supported by
